Smartphone owners need security advice. How can we ensure they get it? by Renaud, Karen et al.
  
 
60. Smartphone Owners Need Security Advice. How Can We 
Ensure They Get It? 
Karen Renaud 
University of Glasgow 
karen.renaud@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Rénette Blignaut & Isabella Venter 
University of the Western Cape 
 
Abstract 
Computer users often behave insecurely, and do not take the precautions they ought to. One reads 
almost daily about people not protecting their devices, not making backups and falling for 
phishing messages. This impacts all of society since people increasingly carry a computer in their 
pockets: their smartphones. It could be that smartphone owners simply do not know enough about 
security threats or precautions. To address this, many official bodies publish advice online. For 
such a broadcast-type educational approach to work, two assumptions must be satisfied. The first 
is that people will deliberately seek out security-related information and the second is that they 
will consult official sources to satisfy their information needs. Assumptions such as these ought to 
be verified, especially with the numbers of cyber attacks on the rise.  
It was decided to explore the validity of these assumptions by surveying students at a South 
African university, including both Computer Science and Non-Computer Science students. The 
intention was to explore levels of awareness of Smartphone security practice, the sources of 
advice the students used, and the impact of a Computer Science education on awareness and 
information seeking behaviours. Awareness, it was found, was variable across the board but 
poorer amongst students without a formal computing education. Moreover, it became clear that 
students often found Facebook more helpful than public media, in terms of obtaining security 
advice. 
The implications of these findings are that the broadcast strategy needs rethinking. If people 
prefer to learn from their peers it is necessary to focus on empowering those within the 
community who can act as advisors, and not to expect people automatically to seek out 
information from official sources. Published guidelines are unlikely to reach the man and woman 
in the street with the required level of efficacy. Our study makes it clear that only by satisfying the 
community needs at the social level can society at large be made more resilient to cyber attack.  
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1. Introduction 
The man and woman in the street increasingly uses online services: to obtain information, read 
and send emails, use social networks, and buy products and services. This personal use, by so-
called home users (The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 2010), is 
reinforced by the growing adoption of the Internet as communication infrastructure.  The most 
commonly used device these days is the smartphone, a handheld computer in everyone’s pocket.  
  
 
Whereas organisations spend a great deal of time and effort ensuring that their employees know 
how to behave securely, personal security has not received as much attention (Alghamdi, 
Flechais & Jirotka, 2015; Li, 2011). According to Kritzinger & Von Solms (2010), 95% of 
Internet attacks target humans, not technical systems. Smartphone owners thus need to be aware 
of, and know how to use, security tools and precautionary measures to protect their devices and 
data from unauthorized access.  
Much research has been conducted into how to improve awareness and knowledge in this area. 
Research into assisting people to resist phishing attacks is a good example (Alnajim & Munro, 
2009; Jansson & Von Solms, 2011; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012; Kumaraguru, Rhee, Acquisti, et 
al., 2007; Maurer, De Luca, & Kempe, 2011). All of the aforementioned research has been 
reported in the academic literature but there is no evidence that it has reached smartphone 
owners. People still seem to be taken in by phishing messages (Ford, 2015; BBC, 2015) and 
since email is now mostly read on smartphones (O’Dell, 2014) this is also a smartphone issue. 
Many governmental and other official bodies have attempted to help smartphone owners to 
protect themselves against threats by publishing advice online1. Yet Kaspersky (2015) report that 
45% of people have encountered malware and 25% have personally been hacked. It does seem 
that, despite advice being freely available, something is amiss in terms of reaching and 
empowering computer users.  
The current broadcasting approach of publishing guidelines and advice on websites, in academic 
literature and in the media is not effective enough. This might be because it relies on two implicit 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1. People experience an information need, realise they lack information, and 
seek to satisfy their information need.  
Assumption 2. People will consult official sources (government sources, security body 
websites and educational institutions) in order to satisfy their information 
needs. 
These assumptions are not necessarily founded. The first assumes that people know that they 
have an information need:  that they know there is something that they do not know. It also 
assumes that, having become aware of such an information need, they will act to satisfy the need 
(Wilson, 1999). This belief is, unfortunately, overly optimistic. Case (2012) explains that 
information seeking behaviour varies widely across people, situations and objects of interest and 
that it is difficult to predict how, or whether, a particular person will go about seeking 
information. Derr (1983) explains that information is only sought when it contributes towards 
satisfaction of a purpose. Even if people become aware of the fact that they do not know how to 
secure their devices, this does not mean that they will act to find out how to remedy the situation 
– unless there is some purpose they are trying to satisfy.  
If the person does have a purpose, and acts deliberately to satisfy an information need, the 
second assumption is that they will seek the information from authoritative sources such as 
                                                 
1 For example: 
http://cybercrime.org.za/reporting; http://www.cyberaware.org.za/; 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-
ncsss/cyber-security-policy-of-south-africa 
  
 
official websites. Yang et al. (2014) point out that information seeking is costly, especially when 
people have to choose which source of information to trust. An assumption that people will go to 
official websites does not acknowledge this cost. Moreover, this does not acknowledge the 
reality that people are social animals, and rely on each other. When they are faced with 
uncertainty it is likely that they will consult trusted individuals first. There is evidence that attests 
to the role society and communities play in meeting an individual’s information needs (Varela, 
1992; Bruner, 1990; Kuhlthau, 1991). The reality is that many rely primarily on peers for advice, 
support and information needs (Bruner, 1990). In this paper the validity of the two assumptions, 
in terms of whether they apply to a student body, will be explored. 
2. Why people do not take smartphone precautions 
There is a great deal of evidence that computer users behave insecurely and that their actions 
potentially compromise the systems they use. For example, they do not control access to their 
mobile phones by using passwords or PINs (Weisbaum, 2014; Kaspersky, 2015). They choose 
weak passwords (Moore, 2015) and do not change their passwords regularly (Ring, 2014). They 
also do not use anti-virus software (ejinsight, 2015) and fall for Phishing attacks (Zetter, 2015). 
Why? Two primary reasons emerge from the literature. The first is related to the history and 
provenance of security software, and the second is related to human tendencies and propensities. 
  Security software provenance 
Early security research focused on providing technical security mechanisms. These were often 
developed without consulting the ‘human in the loop’ despite user interaction being essential to 
their efficacy. In essence, these security mechanisms were designed by experts, for experts. As 
more non-experts started using technology the flawed nature of this paradigm became obvious 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999).  
Whitten and Tygar (1999) point out that users do not apply security mechanisms, despite their 
knowing they ought to, because the mechanisms are not usable enough. They define usable 
secure software as software that: (1) ensures that people are reliably made aware of the security 
tasks they need to perform, (2) ensures that people are able to figure out how to successfully 
perform those tasks, (3) does not allow people to make dangerous errors, and (4) makes its users 
sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it. 
Much researcher effort has gone into improving the usability of security tools in the intervening 
years. A number of new usable security solutions have been made available, often as Add-ons or 
Apps, but, in reality, these have not yet been widely accepted or adopted. It has become clear 
that improving usability is not sufficient, in and of itself, to improve the situation. Clarke et al. 
(Clarke, Furnell, Stewart, & Lacey, 2012) argue strongly against a technocratic approach to 
information security, recommending that the needs of the user be focused on. It is wise also to 
reconsider what other factors are impeding adoption, by focusing on the human user. 
Deterring Factors 
By reviewing the literature, the researchers have attempted to explore the impact of human 
nature on the uptake of mobile security. Renaud et al. (Renaud, Volkamer, & Renkema-Padmos, 
2014) suggest that there is a kind of progression towards secure behaviour. It starts with 
awareness of the problem, which confirms the first assumption above, and then proceeds through 
  
 
a number of other stages, during each of which a smartphone owner can be deterred or distracted 
from acting securely.  
The general lack of information is also confirmed by (Harbach, Fahl, Rieger, & Smith, 2013).  
However, even with awareness, other aspects can deter secure behaviours: lack of concern, lack 
of understanding, lack of compulsion, lack of knowledge of available countermeasures and lack 
of determination to carry things through. The lack of awareness, lack of concern, understanding 
and determination is confirmed by (Shirazi & Volkamer, 2014; Weirich & Sasse, 2001) with 
Weirich and Sasse also emphasizing the lack of response efficacy: the perceived ability to take 
the measures the smartphone owner is well aware of.  
Harbach et al. (Harbach, Fahl, & Smith, 2014) investigated knowledge of security risks. They 
reported that people were indeed aware, but that they did not really apply that awareness to what 
they were doing at that moment. They make a fair point that people in the modern world have to 
deal with multiple demands for their attention. Given that this is so, security sometimes does not 
feature high enough to be given consideration, this could therefore also be referred to as lack of 
attention. Lack of attention is a fact of 21st century life, suggesting that security simply gets 
pushed down when other more prominent attention grabbers are present (Anderson & De 
Palma, 2012). 
Gaw et al. (Gaw, Felten & Fernandez-Kelly, 2006) mention the need for interfaces to be tailored 
toward individual people’s needs, so a lack of personalisation can lead to rejection. They also 
mention the need for security to be more visible, so that decisions made by the system do not 
conflict with what the user wants the system to do. This points to lack of visibility being an issue, 
and confirms the lack of control factor identified by (Harbach et al., 2013). 
Summary 
Based on this literature review, awareness and knowledge constitute necessary, but not sufficient, 
pre-conditions for people to act securely. The deterring factors identified in the preceding 
section may cause someone not to behave securely despite awareness and adequate knowledge of 
how they ought to act. These factors have to be acknowledged as part of the bigger picture, but 
this is not the focus of this paper.  The focus is on security awareness. Figure 1 depicts the 
progression from new ownership to secure smartphone behaviour, without suggesting progression 
down the path is inevitable or predictable, merely that this path is required for knowledge to be 
gained.  
3. Methodology 
To explore the validity of the two assumptions an investigation was carried out with two groups 
of university students as participants and investigated: 
1. How aware are people of smartphone security issues, and does a Computing education 
make a difference? 
2. Where do people go for advice about security?  
It was decided to deploy students in a third year Computer Science course to act as researchers 
and gather data about smartphone security. This exercise was also used to make the students 
  
 
themselves more aware of the security issues, and trained them in carrying out user-centred 
research ethically.  
 
 
Figure 1: Path towards knowledge of security threats and precautions  
Student teams were instructed to assume that they were employed by a large smartphone 
company who wanted to determine how aware smartphone users are of security and privacy. 
Student researchers were instructed to interview two randomly selected fellow students; one who 
had never taken a Computer Science course, and the other who was currently a Computer 
Science student (but not in the same class i.e. not doing the same project). This allowed the 
researchers to determine whether a Computing education (1) had an impact on awareness, and 
(2) whether other people consulted these students for advice.  
Students were provided with a semi-structured interview to guide their interviews and to ensure 
that findings could aggregated.  
Each team was required to write a report about the individual team member findings and to 
compare their findings with the literature addressing security and privacy issues. For the rest of 
this report the two groupings will be referred to as: Non-Computer Science (NCS) and Computer 
Science (CS) students.  
4. Results 
In 2015, 84 students were interviewed (42 CS and 42 NCS).  About a third of the selected 
participants were female, however 21% of the CS participants whereas 50% of NCS participants 
were female.  The majority (90%) of the participants were born in South Africa.  Most (64%) of 
the participants grew up in cities, 25% in small towns and 11% in rural areas.  On average the 
  
 
participants have been using smartphones for 4 years (minimum 1 and maximum 10 years).  
Most (77%) always have their mobile phones within reach. 
4.1  Security behaviour (indicating awareness & knowledge) 
It was found that significantly more (88%) CS participants regularly installed system updates and 
upgrades on their mobile phones, as compared to the NCS group (67%) (χ 2=4.5; p=0.0334)2.  
When installing new applications slightly more of the NCS participants (40%) divulged their 
location whereas only 26% of the CS group did so (χ2=1.9; p=0.1649). 
Data encryption on sensitive information was used more often by the CS participants (55%) 
compared to 24% of the NCS group (χ2=8.4; p=0.0037). Advice about security was sourced from 
the Internet and from other smartphone users, but no difference was noted between the two 
groups (χ2=6.1; p=0.1089).   
Thirty-five percent of participants said that they would never share password/PIN with others, 
33% said they would share their password/PIN with family or friends, 20% indicated that they 
would share in cases of emergency, 7% would sometimes do it and 5% did not protect their 
phone with a password/PIN.  No difference was found between the groups (χ2=1.4; p=0.8516).  
When participants were asked if a PIN/password is shielded when entered (when unlocking their 
phones in the presence of friends) 27% said no and 29% said yes and some (44%) indicated the 
situation would dictate their behaviour.  The two groups did not differ in their behaviour (χ2=4.9; 
p=0.1815).  Participants in general, when they shared their passwords, did not regret it 
(CS=77%; NCS=61%)(χ2=1.9; p=0.1614). 
Significantly more (59%) of the CS participants know what encryption was, as compared the 
NCS group (34%)(χ2=8.6; p=0.0136) and significantly more of the CS participants use 
encryption (43%) as compared to 15% of the NCS group (χ2=7.4; p=0.0243). 
In Figure 2 it can be seen that the two groups felt very similarly with respect to social media and 
its impact on security issues. Figure 3 demonstrates that participants avoided using particular 
mobile functions due to their perceptions of its security or privacy implications.  
4.2  Sources of advice 
Both groups felt public media failed to provide helpful information about smartphone 
privacy/security issues (CS=62%; NCS=69%)(χ2=0.5; p=0.4752). However, they indicated that 
social media did satisfy their needs (CS=58%; NCS=61%)(χ2=0.1; p=0.7503). Significantly more 
CS participants (29%) offered security advice to other smartphone users, as compared to the 
NCS group (7%)(χ2=7.8; p=0.0205).   
                                                 
2 Quantitative data were analysed statistically using a statistical package SAS®. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Social media perceptions 
 
Figure 3: Non-use because of security or privacy implications 
5. Discussion 
This section returns to consider the two assumptions. Those who are doing their best to give 
smartphone owners the requisite knowledge so that they can secure their devices and resist 
attacks generally believe that making information available online is the way to reach as many 
people as possible at a reasonable cost. This research examined the two assumptions that would 
need to be true for such a broadcasting approach to be effective.  
5.1 Awareness Assumption 
Awareness of advised secure behaviours was surprisingly low, even amongst this well-educated 
sample. For example, very few (less than 15%) of both groups knew about social media being 
governed by the same laws as normal publications and that a person can be held liable for the 
  
 
content that is retweeted, shared or liked (about 50%).  Yet most (approximately 70%) realized 
that irresponsible posts on social media could harm future career opportunities.  
Security behaviours are a decent indicator of awareness, since no one will perform the behaviour 
without the requisite awareness. Awareness is a necessary pre-requisite, but not a determinant. 
Comparisons between those educated in Computer Science and those who were studying other 
subjects show that a CS education has a definite impact on mobile security awareness. We noted 
significant differences in terms of applying system updates, encrypting information and being 
able to offer advice to other people about security issues. CS participants, by clearly being more 
aware than the other students, coinfirmed the benefits of a computing-related education.  
Even amongst CS participants awareness was not guaranteed. For example, only 55% of CS 
participants encrypt sensitive information. Moreover, students across both groups shared 
passwords equally, something that one could expect education to deter. This confirms that 
awareness does not necessarily lead to further information seeking, nor does knowledge 
infallably lead to secure behaviours (Renaud & Goucher, 2014; Greig et al., 2015).  
5.2 Sources of advice and information preferences 
Participants said they consulted the Internet and friends to get advice but they said that public 
media was less useful than Facebook, where they consulted friends. The problem with consulting 
the Web is that they have no way of verifying the accuracy of the proffered advice (Flechais et 
al., 2013), which could leave them vulnerable but with a false sense of security.  The students 
seemed to have come to the same conclusion, finding Facebook more helpful in terms of getting 
good advice.  
Consulting peers might also be risky, but at least they are in a position to judge the 
trustworthiness and expertise of the people they request advice from. The fact that CS 
participants gave advice to others significantly more often than NCS participants suggests that 
people are indeed seeking out knowledgeable peers to consult. The use of social media, across 
both groups, confirms this tendency to consult friends. The fact that public media was considered 
not to offer helpful advice is telling – one would have expected the media to play a role in 
educating the public but they seem to be failing at this. Source preferences should inform future 
strategies to assist the man and woman in the street. It should be possible to foster and encourage 
this kind of peer-wise assistance more than is currently the case by ensuring that key people 
within the community have the requisite knowledge to provide advice and assistance to others.  
6. Conclusion and future work 
Hackers target anyone who is vulnerable and many smartphone owners are extremely vulnerable 
since they do not take precautions or use tools to protect their privacy and ensure resilience to 
attack. This is the case despite the efforts of governments and other bodies to publish reliable and 
helpful security related advice. The two assumptions need to be valid for this advice to make a 
difference. To conclude, awareness is variable, with a computing education paying dividends in 
this respect, but not guaranteeing secure behaviours and precaution implementation. It was also 
confirmed that students consulted their peers when they needed advice about security issues. 
This means that security support to smartphone users needs to be altered. Posting information on 
the Web with the intention of informing those who need it is probably misguided, as it will not 
significantly impact on general security awareness and lead to secure behaviours.  
  
 
In future, the project will include societies from other countries and the questionnaire will be 
expanded to include more community-orientated questions.  
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